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The dark side of strengthening minority shareholder voting power: an innovation perspective
發布時間 2019-11-23 21:34:51    來源:本站  點擊次數

江西財經大學金融學院蛟湖金融論壇2019年第20  期(總第 87  期)

目:The dark side of strengthening minority shareholder voting power: an innovation perspective

時    間:1129日(周五)上午10:00

地    點:金融學院二樓東頭報告廳

報告人:安云碧 教授



安云碧教授是加拿大皇后大學金融學博士,現任加拿大溫莎大學Odette商學院金融學教授,其主要研究領域包括公司財務金融、資產組合選擇與資產組合保險、風險管理等。曾在Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Journal of International Money and Finance, Small Business EconomicsJournal of Futures Markets等國際期刊發表論文三十余篇。安教授的學術成果得到了國內外金融理論與實務界的廣泛承認,多次受邀參加EFMA, EFA, MFA, 以及NFA等舉辦的金融學年會,并擔任許多國際著名期刊的審稿專家。


Based on the regulatory reforms designed to strengthen the protection of legitimate rights and interests of minority investors in 2014 in China, we investigate minority shareholders’ short-termism and the dark side of strengthened minority voting power after the reforms. We find that strengthened minority voting power negatively impacts innovation outputs as measured by both invention patent and utility model patent counts. We show that the reduced innovation outcomes cannot be explained by the weakened monitoring from major shareholders associated with high ownership dispersion. Moreover, strengthened minority voting power helps enhance the vesting target earnings growth rate in executive incentive plans and top executive turnover-performance sensitivity, which in turn undermine innovation. Finally, the negative impact of minority voting power on innovation is particularly pronounced for firms with non-entrenched managers, a lower average percentage of equity ownership, and a lower percentage of ownership by pressure resistant institutions.